Mild majority, intense minority

100 voters decide one issue. A majority mildly prefers Option A. A minority strongly prefers Option B. Compare what one-person-one-vote and quadratic voting would each decide.

Illustrative model, not a prediction. Each voter has 100 credits shared across four issues of similar stakes and spends them in proportion to how much they care about each. The majority cares equally about all four (level 2). The minority cares at the chosen level about this issue and level 1 about the other three. Votes on this issue = level x sqrt(100 / sum of squared levels). Quadratic voting can protect an intense minority, and critics argue it can also let a passionate minority outweigh a mild majority. The paper proposes it for budgets, and this page exists to test that trade-off. Every rule on this page is a proposal, and CIP is not live.